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Abstract
To account for the widespread human tendency to cooperate in one-shot social dilemmas, some theorists have proposed
that cooperators can be reliably detected based on ethological displays that are difficult to fake. Experimental findings have
supported the view that cooperators can be distinguished from defectors based on ‘‘thin slices’’ of behavior, but the
relevant cues have remained elusive, and the role of the judge’s perspective remains unclear. In this study, we followed
triadic conversations among unacquainted same-sex college students with unannounced dyadic one-shot prisoner’s
dilemmas, and asked participants to guess the PD decisions made toward them and among the other two participants. Two
other sets of participants guessed the PD decisions after viewing videotape of the conversations, either with foreknowledge
(informed), or without foreknowledge (naı¨ve), of the post-conversation PD. Only naı¨ve video viewers approached better-
than-chance prediction accuracy, and they were significantly accurate at predicting the PD decisions of only opposite-sexed
conversation participants. Four ethological displays recently proposed to cue defection in one-shot social dilemmas (arms
crossed, lean back, hand touch, and face touch) failed to predict either actual defection or guesses of defection by any
category of observer. Our results cast doubt on the role of ‘‘greenbeard’’ signals in the evolution of human prosociality,
although they suggest that eavesdropping may be more informative about others’ cooperative propensities than direct
interaction.
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Introduction
Humans frequently cooperate with each other in one-shot
anonymous economic games [1–3]. Despite considerable cross-
cultural variation, the observed cooperation rate is much higher
than predicted by an economic model based on pure self-interest,
even when kin selection [4,5] and reciprocal altruism [6] are taken
into account. This poses an evolutionary puzzle: how did such
cooperation evolve?
Two competing explanations are cultural group selection (e.g.
[7]), and the prevalence, in ancestral environments, of a single
interaction predicting future interactions with the same individual
[8]. A third line of theorizing proposes that unrelated cooperators
assort by self-identifying with voluntary signals [9–11]. Any such
‘‘greenbeard’’ signal is open to exploitation by deceptive defectors
who falsely signal as if they are cooperators [12]. The Frank-
Hirshleifer model attempts to solve this problem by proposing that
moral emotions such as sympathy and gratitude motivate
economically ‘‘irrational’’ generosity, while simultaneously gener-
ating ethological displays of intent to cooperate, that are reliable
because they are difficult to fake. A functional link between
generosity-motivating emotions and communicative signals of
cooperation allows for reliable assortment among cooperators,
while guarding against exploitation by defectors. One problem
with this approach is that simply making signaling more costly or
difficult for defectors would favor the eventual spread of any
mutation allowing defectors to signal cooperation at the same low
cost incurred by cooperators [13,14]. Even commitment-related
emotions such as guilt, operating in conjunction with predictive
accuracy in a one-shot social dilemma, cannot prevent uncondi-
tional defectors from invading [15]. In contrast, an ongoing
evolutionary arms race between deceptive signalers and skeptical
signal receivers could generate a mix of frequent dyadic
cooperation and rare exploitation [16].
Despite these theoretical problems, a growing body of research
seems to support the Frank-Hirshleifer model in showing that
people can judge others’ propensity to defect in one-shot social
dilemmas based on brief social interactions. Frank et al. [17] found
that participants could predict others’ choices in a Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD) game at above-chance levels, after the three
participants talked for 30 minutes—during which they could make
unenforceable promises about game play. Brosig [18] replicated
this result, even after excluding predictions made about partici-
pants who stated that they would defect. Reed et al. [19] also
replicated this result. DeSteno et al. [20] found that strangers
conversing face-to-face before playing an unannounced continu-
ous PD game (dubbed the Give-Some Game) predicted each
other’s choices more accurately than strangers who interacted only
via a web-based chat. Kikuchi et al. (1997, cited in [21]; T.
Yamagishi, personal communication) found accurate PD play
prediction following a neutral-topic discussion among strangers
who did not know they would play a game.
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Various sources of information may be reliably indexing future
behavior in these studies [9–11]. Some evidence suggests that
facial expressions may accurately signal cooperative intent. Reed
et al. [19] found that individuals who smiled more (whether
Duchenne or not) while promising cooperation in a one-shot PD
were more likely to cooperate than those who displayed contempt.
Studies measuring cooperation in a variety of ways have linked
facial displays of emotion with cooperativeness or trustworthiness
[22–25]. General emotional expressivity, regardless of positivity,
may signal cooperativeness [26]. Schug et al. [27] found that
individuals who made more generous offers in an Ultimatum game
also showed more emotional expression in response to unfair
Ultimatum game offers.
Particular gestures and postures may also reliably signal
cooperative propensities. DeSteno et al. [20] found that individ-
uals scoring higher on a unit-weighted aggregate of the frequencies
of four behaviors (arms crossed, lean back, hand touch, and face
touch) while conversing with a stranger transferred fewer
monetary tokens in an unannounced post-conversation Give-
Some game. A second experiment showed that a humanoid robot
operated to produce these cues was expected, by human
participants, to transfer fewer tokens in the Give-Some game,
compared to the same robot when operated to produce other
gestures.
The ‘‘thin slice’’ literature further suggests that immediately
observable features of individuals may index cooperative disposi-
tions. Research shows that ‘‘thin slices’’ of behavior can facilitate
accurate judgments of stable individual propensities to cooperate
[28]. The relevant cues may be stable physical traits. Facial
masculinity in men is negatively associated with cooperativeness
[29,30], and men with lower second-to-fourth digit ratios (a proxy
for prenatal testosterone exposure) are less trusting than those with
higher 2D:4D ratios [31].
Most research in this area has been limited to individual-level
attributes as cues to defection or exploitation. DeSteno et al. [20]
draw attention to the importance of context-specific decisions to
defect, and context-specific cues of impending defection. In fact,
the majority of participants in social dilemma situations are
conditional cooperators, not pure cooperators or pure defectors
[32–35]. This suggests that actors’ decisions are affected to some
extent by perceived dyad-specific probabilities of cooperation, as
well as the commonly studied individual-level and contextual
variables [36]. Significantly, conditional behavior is not inconsis-
tent with detection of future defection. ‘‘Thin slice’’ research has
shown that people can quickly make accurate judgments about the
quality of others’ dyadic social relationships (e.g. therapist-client
relationships) [37].
Defector detection may be thus facilitated by many sources of
information both about stable behavioral dispositions and context-
specific intentions. In addition, in naturalistic settings, the
circumstances under which people assess each other’s cooperative
propensities are quite varied. This implies that a wide range of
experimental designs is needed to illuminate the role of defector-
detection in supporting the evolution of one-shot cooperation. For
example, there is probably considerable variation in the extent to
which defector detection is a salient goal while potential judges are
processing information relevant to predicting future behavior. In
most experimental defector-detection research, participants are
informed about the nature of the judgment task they will complete,
prior to the presentation of the stimuli (cf. Kikuchi et al. 1997,
cited in [21]; [38]). In most experimental protocols, participants
are informed of their impending social dilemma decision before
conversing, and are (1) instructed not to discuss the game (e.g.
[39]) or else (2) allowed to discuss and ‘‘disclose’’ their game-play
decisions (e.g. [17]). The former must make for awkward social
interactions, while the latter transforms the ‘‘defector-detection’’
challenge into the rather different task of ‘‘liar-detection’’ [40]. To
our knowledge, only two pieces of published research have
assessed the accuracy of defector-detection based on social
interaction preceding an unannounced social dilemma: the
DeSteno et al. [20] study described above, and the Kikuchi et
al. (1997, cited in [21]), who found that only participants scoring
high on general trust accurately predicted the PD decisions of co-
participants.
Another issue that has received little attention in the defector-
detection literature is that predictions about others’ cooperation
may differ as a function of whether the judge is a second party
(recipient) or third party (observer), and whether the judge is
present for the face-to-face interaction or sees a videotaped version
of it. ‘‘Thin slice’’ research typically privileges experimental
control over ecological validity by presenting participants with
media-based stimuli [41], as does most research on defector-
detection [22,25,28,38,42–44]. Only a few studies have asked
participants to predict others’ play following face-to-face interac-
tion [17,18,20,21].
At least three considerations suggest that patterns of prediction
will differ between face-to-face and media-viewing contexts. First,
it may be that only face-to-face interactions activate the
neurophysiological and hormonal mechanisms underpinning
cooperation or trust [45,46]. It is unclear how this may affect
the accuracy of predictions, one of the key empirical questions for
theory on the evolution of cooperation. Second, actors may make
predictions that reduce cognitive dissonance with respect to their
own decisions; for instance, a defector may avoid feeling like a
cheater by predicting that others will also defect. Finally, the
cognitive demands of self-presentation to strangers might interfere
with other cognitive tasks [47], including judgments of others’
propensities to cooperate. This could decrease the accuracy of 2nd
party face-to-face predictions relative to those of a 3rd party.
In the present study, we address these methodological issues by
investigating how two experimental tools frequently used in the
study of defector-detection—video-mediation for third party
judges, and prior knowledge of an upcoming game—may affect
the behavioral predictions that judges make about participant
game play in a one-shot PD. We do this by forming conversational
triads and comparing the predictions by four types of judges: First,
the conversation participants (who had not been told about the PD
before beginning the conversation) guessed their two co-partici-
pants’ decisions toward themselves (2nd party). Second, the
conversation participants guessed their two co-participants’
decisions toward each other (3rd party insider). Third, a separate
set of participants guessed the conversation participants’ PD
decisions after viewing a video of the conversation, without being
told about the PD before viewing the video (naı¨ve 3rd party
outsiders). Finally, another set of participants were told about the
PD decision-guessing task before viewing conversation video
(informed 3rd party outsiders).
We address several specific empirical questions. First, do the
four types of judges differ in the rates of baseline cooperation they
predict? Second, are predictions concordant across judge types?
Third, which, if any, of the four judge types can make accurate
predictions? Fourth, do judges expect intra-individual consistency
across decisions? And fifth, irrespective of accuracy, what cues or
variables inform judges’ predictions?
The analyses on defector detection presented here build on our
findings regarding the actual determinants of our conversation
participants’ PD decisions [48]. We found two main effects: people
were more likely to cooperate (1) if they grew up in a wealthier zip
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code and (2) towards more facially attractive co-participants. We
also found two interaction effects with subclinical primary
psychopathy (callous affect, interpersonal manipulation) as mea-
sured by the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale [49]: people
higher in primary psychopathy were less likely to cooperate toward
co-participants (1) who had interrupted them more frequently and
(2) with whom they had discovered no common ground (e.g.
shared acquaintance or academic major). We interpreted these
results as supporting a view of subclinical primary psychopathy as
a strategy of selective defection toward prospective social partners
perceived to be of low value. One goal of the present paper is to
determine whether the independent variables that affect an
individual’s actual PD decisions also affect observers’ guesses of
that individual’s PD decisions. Another goal is to replicate
DeSteno et al’s [20] findings regarding ethological cues of
untrustworthiness in an unannounced one-shot social dilemma
following a conversation among strangers. In general, we found a
lack of accurate defector detection and a lack of agreement among
different guessers. These findings cast doubt on the role of defector
detection in the evolution of human cooperation.
Materials and Methods
Participants
This study involved three distinct groups of participants.
Conversation participants (N = 105) were recruited on a USA
college campus [48]. The publicized study title was ‘‘Small Talk
Among Strangers.’’ All participants were offered $10 USD
compensation. Participants were scheduled in groups of three
same-sexed individuals, and were screened upon arrival to make
sure they had not met previously. The median participant age was
19 years.
Naı¨ve third party outsiders (hereafter, naı¨ve video viewers:
N = 70, 49 female) and informed third party outsiders (hereafter,
informed video viewers: N = 35, 28 female) were recruited from
the same participant pool, during academic years following the
completion of the conversation/PD trials. Naı¨ve video viewers
received course credit and a $6 payment, and could earn an
additional $6 by making accurate predictions about gameplay (see
below). Informed video viewers received course credit and a $3
payment, and could earn an additional $12 by making accurate
predictions about gameplay. Third party participants were not
asked their ages.
All procedures were approved by the UCLA Institutional
Review Board (Approvals #G07-10-097-01 to -04; #G10-01-004-
01; and #10-000371). Written informed consent was obtained
from all participants in accordance with the terms of these
approvals.
Procedure
Conversation participants were informed that their conversation
would be videotaped. Logistical and resource constraints limited
the protocol to a single video camera, which directly faced one of
the three participants. The identity of this participant was
determined randomly. From the point of view of video viewers,
the other two conversation participants were in profile. After 10
minutes of conversation, participants played an unannounced,
computer-moderated one-shot PD toward each of the others.
During the PD, they could ‘‘Keep’’ for themselves ( = defect) or
‘‘Transfer’’ to a recipient ( = cooperate) a $3 endowment provided
by the experimenter; transferred funds were doubled and added to
recipient payoffs. Unilateral defection yielded $9, mutual cooper-
ation yielded $6, mutual defection yielded $3, and unilateral
cooperation yielded $0. Participants then guessed how each co-
participant played toward them (second party predictions) and
toward one another (third party insider predictions). Each correct
guess earned them $1. Prior to game play, we informed
participants that one of them would not receive their earned
payoff, but instead a randomly chosen, realistic payoff. This
protected the confidentiality of participants’ PD choices without
eliminating their relevance to payoffs (see [17]). After the
conversation, gameplay, and predictions, participants completed
the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (LSRP) [49] and
reported their childhood zip code. All game play and question-
naire data were gathered using z-Tree Version 2.1 [50]. Finally,
participants were photographed and given payoffs in sealed
envelopes.
Coding of interruptions is described elsewhere [48]. For the
entire 10-min duration of every video, a research assistant,
ignorant of our hypotheses, coded every onset and offset of the
four behaviors found by DeSteno et al. [20] to predict smaller
transfers to co-participants in a Give-Some Game: arms crossed, lean
back, hand touch, and face touch. To ensure comparability, we
obtained a detailed coding protocol from D. DeSteno (personal
communication). A second research assistant, also ignorant of our
hypotheses, independently coded 6 randomly chosen conversa-
tions of the 35 (i.e. 18 of 105 participants) for these four behaviors.
JHM prepared video and still photographs for presentation to
the naı¨ve and informed video viewers, using SuperLab 4.0. Each
naı¨ve video viewer viewed one 10-minute conversation video.
Video viewers first acknowledged they had never met the
participants in the video. Prior to their viewing, we told naı¨ve
video viewers that the video would show a ‘‘conversation among
three people meeting for the first time. After viewing the tape, you
will be asked some questions about the behavior of these people.’’
After showing the video, we presented the PD instructions to the
video viewer, who was asked to guess participant PD decisions
(‘‘Keep’’ or ‘‘Transfer’’) in each direction for each dyad of
conversation participants. This yielded six PD guesses per viewer.
Each viewer watched only one conversation video, and each video
received a total of two viewer ratings. The procedure was identical
for the informed video viewers, except that, before showing them
the video, we showed them the PD instructions and explained that
they would be asked to guess game play following the video
viewing. Informed viewers repeated this for a second video; naı¨ve
viewers moved on to rate 21 conversational participants for facial
attractiveness on a six-point Likert scale. (They did not rate
participants from the video they watched). Both naı¨ve and
informed video viewers, like conversation participants, were
awarded $1 USD for each correct guess of a PD decision. See
[48] for additional details.
Data Analysis
See [48] for details of calculating attractiveness scores,
psychopathy scores, childhood zip code median income, and
interruption rates. Following DeSteno et al. ([20] and personal
communication), we used the individual’s mean frequency of
onsets of the four putative cues of untrustworthiness (arms crossed,
lean back, hand touch, and face touch) as an independent variable
hypothesized to be inversely associated with probability of
cooperating.
We examined frequencies of agreement among guessers, and
guesser prediction accuracy, with respect to their deviations from
chance frequencies based on the base rates of actual cooperation
and predictions of cooperation (see [17]). Since each guesser
evaluated multiple conversation participants, we examined inter-
rater agreement and accuracy of game play predictions using log-
linear (poisson regression) models rather than Kappa [51], in order
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to control for non-independence of ratings. In all cases, we present
the conservative standard errors and confidence intervals based on
data clustered by the individual guesser.
In relating our independent and dependent variables, we used
bivariate and multivariate logistic regression models. Since each
actor made multiple and therefore non-independent predictions,
we calculated robust standard errors of the odds ratios, clustering
by the identity of the individual making the predictions, before
calculating confidence intervals and P-values. For all analyses
involving PD decisions, cooperation was coded as 1, and defection
as 0. All tests are 2-tailed. The data for this study can be accessed
in the Dryad repository [52].
Results
We obtained adequate inter-rater reliabilities of (1) the coding of
interruptions between JHM and a research assistant, and (2) facial
attractiveness ratings among participant raters (naı¨ve video
viewers) [48]. For the 18 participants whose frequencies of the
four gestural/postural behaviors were coded by two research
assistants, Cronbach’s alpha between the two coders’ mean values
of the four behaviors was 0.98.
Coders were unable to reliably code frequencies of at least one
of the 4 gestural/postural behaviors for 15 of the 105 (14.3%)
conversation participants. Such cases included, for example, 11
individuals seated in the chair directly facing the camera whose
lean back behavior could not be reliably coded. These 15
individuals were excluded from analyses of the gestures/postures.
Other missing data points included two conversation partici-
pants who declined to play the PD, one conversation participant
who declined to guess her co-participants’ PD decisions, and 4
naı¨ve video viewers and one informed video viewer each who
declined to guess one PD decision. Missing data points were
excluded from analyses on a casewise basis.
Base rates of predicted cooperation are generally
inaccurate
In Gervais et al. [48], we report that 136/206 (66%) of actual
PD decisions were to cooperate. Figure 1 compares this to the
percentage of guesses of cooperation by the four guesser types:
recipient’s guesses of actor’s decisions toward herself (2nd party); other’s
guesses of actor’s decisions toward recipient (3rd party insider); naı¨ve
video viewer (3rd party outsider) guesses; and informed video
viewer (3rd party outsider) guesses. Two-sample tests of propor-
tions revealed that unlike conversation participants, video viewers
(both naı¨ve and informed) significantly underestimated the actual
base rate of cooperation. Third party insiders, compared to all
three other types of guessers, expected a significantly higher rate of
cooperation that was not significantly different from the actual
base rate.
No agreement among participants’ PD gameplay guesses
The six participants who guessed each PD decision did not
agree with each other above chance levels. None of the three pairs
of guessers (2nd vs. 3rd party insiders; two naı¨ve video viewers; two
informed video viewers) agreed at above chance levels (2nd–3rd
party insiders: d6SE =20.06260.051, P.0.2; naı¨ve video
viewers: d6SE = 0.00760.067, P.0.9; informed video viewers:
d6SE = .00960.097, P.0.9). Furthermore, for all PD decisions
(N = 204) guessed at by all six participants, we calculated the
observed aggregate frequencies (0–6) of guesses of cooperation,
and compared these with the frequencies expected by chance
based on the observed base rates of cooperation predictions made
by the four categories of guessers. If guessers tended to agree, we
would expect an overrepresentation of high (5–6) and low (0–1)
counts. In fact, the observed counts of 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 and 0
cooperation guesses (5, 32, 59, 54, 42, 10 and 3 respectively) were
not significantly different from the expected counts of 6.1, 29.3,
58.4, 61.5, 36.1, 11.2 and 1.4 (x2 = 4.01, df = 6, P.0.6).
PD game guesses are generally inaccurate
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics and analyses (poisson
regression) of the accuracy of PD game guesses by the four classes
of guessers: (1) 2nd party (recipient guessing actor’s PD decision
toward himself); 3rd party insider (other guessing actor’s PD decision
toward recipient); (3) naı¨ve video viewer and (4) informed video
viewer. Only naı¨ve video viewers approached significant accuracy.
Although we did not predict any sex effects on video viewers’
prediction accuracy, post-hoc examination of our data revealed
that this trend toward accurate prediction was driven entirely by
the guesses of the 29 naı¨ve video viewers who predicted the PD
play of conversation participants of the opposite sex
(d6SE = 0.30760.103, P,0.01), whereas the 41 naı¨ve video
viewers who predicted the play of same-sex conversation
participants guessed at chance levels (d6SE = 0.00460.084,
P.0.9) (Figure 2). Females predicting the play of males (N = 19)
were especially accurate (d6SE = 0.29560.125, P,0.05), while
males predicting the play of females (N = 10) were marginally
accurate (d6SE = 0.36460.199, P = 0.067). For the informed
video viewers, we did not find any sex interaction effects.
Predictions of the PD decisions made by conversation partic-
ipants facing the video camera (naı¨ve video viewers:
d6SE = 0.05760.063, P.0.3; informed video viewers:
d6SE =20.00660.086, P.0.9) were no more accurate than
predictions of the decisions made by conversation participants who
were not facing the camera (naı¨ve video viewers:
d6SE = 0.07460.073, P.0.3; informed video viewers:
d6SE =20.00960.106, P.0.9).
Video viewers underestimate intra-individual consistency
in PD play
Of the 105 conversation participants, 79 (75.2%) predicted that
both their co-participants would make the same PD decision
toward both that person’s co-participants. In contrast, only 19/70
(27.1%) of naı¨ve video viewers guessed that all three conversation
participants would make the same PD decision toward both their
co-participants. Five of 105 (4.8%) conversation participants
predicted that both their co-participants made one decision to
cooperate and one decision to defect, whereas 6/70 (8.6%) naı¨ve
video viewers predicted that all three conversation participants
would make divergent decisions toward their two co-participants.
Similarly, among the 35 informed video viewers, the mean (6 SD)
number of conversation participants (out of six) that were guessed
to make consistent PD decisions toward both co-participants was
3.3461.19. In fact, over 90% of conversation participants made
the same PD decision toward both co-participants [48].
Variables affecting guesses of PD decisions
Tables 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 show the results of bivariate and
multivariate logistic regressions in which the guesses (cooperate or
defect) of each class of guesser is the dependent variable, and the
independent variables are (1) actors’ unit-weighted frequencies of
the four behaviors arms crossed, lean back, hand touch, and face touch
(henceforth, the DeSteno et al. [20] cues) and (2) those
independent variables that constituted the most predictive model
of actual PD play as reported by Gervais et al. [48]: recipient’s
attractiveness, actor’s childhood zip code median income, actor’s
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primary psychopathy LSRP score, recipient’s rate of interrupting
actor, actor-recipient common ground discovered during conversa-
tion, and the statistical interactions between actor’s primary
psychopathy score and recipient’s rate of interrupting actor, and
between actor’s primary psychopathy score and the discovery of
actor-recipient common ground. The four multivariate models
(Tables 6, 7, 8) vary with respect to their inclusion of (1) recipient’s
PD decision toward actor (for the 2nd party guesses) or other’s guess
of actor’s PD decision toward him- or herself (for the 3rd party
insiders) and (2) the frequency of DeSteno et al. [20] cues displayed
by actor.
Bivariate Tests
In general, the bivariate tests (Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5) show that
neither the DeSteno et al. [20] cues nor the Gervais et al. [48]
independent variables performed at better than chance levels in
predicting the guesses of any class of guesser. The exceptions were
that 3rd party insiders were marginally more likely to guess
cooperation when the recipient was more attractive, and informed
video viewers were significantly influenced toward greater
accuracy by the interaction between actor’s primary psychopathy
score and recipient’s rate of interrupting actor, i.e. they expected
actors higher in primary psychopathy to be less likely to cooperate
toward recipients who had interrupted them more frequently.
Multivariate Models: Predictors of Second Party Guesses
Table 6 shows the results of four multivariate logistic regression
models in which the outcome variable is recipient’s guess of actor’s
PD decision toward him/herself (2nd party guesses). Among
recipients’ guesses of actors’ PD decisions toward themselves, 177/
204 (86.8%) were concordant with the recipient’s own PD decision
toward that actor (i.e. decisions to cooperate were accompanied by
expectations of cooperation, and decisions to defect were
accompanied by expectations of defection). Thus, it is unsurprising
that recipient’s PD decision toward actor massively predicts recipient’s
guess of actor’s PD decision toward recipient. Models 2 and 4, which
lack this independent variable, perform quite poorly at predicting
recipient’s guess of actor’s PD decision. Within the multivariate
models, the DeSteno et al. [20] cues had no independent effect on
recipients’ guesses, nor did their inclusion improve the predictive
power of the models. Without the DeSteno et al. [20] cues, and
controlling for recipient’s PD decision toward actor, recipients
significantly expected actors higher in primary psychopathy to be
more likely to cooperate toward them.
Multivariate Models: Predictors of Third Party Insider
Guesses
Table 7 shows analogous models of predictors of others’ guesses
of actors’ PD decisions toward recipients (3rd party insider guesses).
Here, the models vary with respect to their inclusion, among the
independent variables, of (1) others’ guesses of actors’ PD decisions
toward themselves and (2) actors’ DeSteno et al. [20] cues. Given
our finding that 75.2% of conversation participants predicted that
both their co-participants would make the same PD decision
toward both themselves and the other co-participants, it is
unsurprising that other’s prediction of actor’s PD decision toward
Figure 1. Percentages of guesses of cooperation, relative to actual cooperation rate, as a function of guesser type. Guesser types are
Recipients of the PD decision (N = 208), Third party insiders (N= 210), Naı¨ve video viewers (N = 416), and Informed video viewers (N = 419). Standard
errors are indicated. Two-sample difference of proportion tests: Actual vs. Informed, P,0.001; Actual vs. Naive, P,0.01; Recipient vs. Third party,
P,0.05; Third party vs. Naive, P,0.01; Third party vs. Informed, P,0.001. All other differences were non-significant.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0082531.g001
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recipient was largely a function of other’s prediction of actor’s PD
decision toward him- or herself. Controlling for the latter
independent variable, others expected actors to be more likely to
cooperate toward more attractive recipients. Within the multivariate
models, the DeSteno et al. [20] cues had no independent effect on
others’ guesses, although they slightly improved the predictive
power of the model that included, as an independent variable,
other’s prediction of actor’s PD decision toward him- or herself.
Multivariate Models: Predictors of Video Viewers’ Guesses
Table 8 shows models of the Gervais et al. [48] independent
variables, with and without the DeSteno et al. [20] cues, as
predictors of video viewers’ guesses (3rd party outsider guesses).
None of the models explained more than 3% of the variance in
video viewers’ guesses. Within the multivariate models, the
DeSteno et al. [20] cues had no independent effect on video
viewers’ guesses. Naı¨ve video viewers appeared to be influenced in
their guesses by the interaction between actor’s primary psychop-
athy score and the discovery of actor-recipient common ground, but
in the opposite direction of the actual effect on game play: naı¨ve
video viewers expected that following the discovery of common
ground, actors higher in primary psychopathy would be more likely
to defect. Informed video viewers were influenced in the correct
direction by the interaction between actor’s primary psychopathy
score and recipient’s interruptions of actor: they expected actors
Figure 2. Accuracy of naı¨ve video viewer PD guesses as a function of sexes of guesser and target. Dashed lines bracket the percentages
of correct guesses expected under H0, which varied among guesser-target pairings as a function of the base rates of actual PD decisions and guesses.
Standard errors are indicated. Guesser-target pairings are females guessing females’ PD decisions (N = 176), males guessing males (N= 66), females
guessing males (N= 113), and males guessing females (N = 54). In 7 cases, guesses could be not classified as correct or incorrect, because the target
made no PD decision.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0082531.g002
Table 1. Accuracy of guesses by four classes of guessers.
Guesser class N (guesses) Clusters (guessers)
Expected correct
guesses
Observed correct
guesses dc±SE P
2nd partya 206 103 108.1 109 0.0060.05 .0.80
3rd party insiderb 206 103 116.5 112 0.0060.06 .0.90
Naı¨ve video viewer 409 70 210.4 228 0.1260.07 0.06
Informed video viewer 411 35 206.6 213 0.0060.07 .0.90
arecipient guessing actor’s decision toward herself.
bother guessing actor’s decision toward recipient.
ccoefficient of delta in Poisson regression model.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0082531.t001
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higher in primary psychopathy to be more likely to defect toward
recipients that had interrupted them more frequently.
No relation between DeSteno et al. [20] cues and actual
PD decisions
Participants who displayed the DeSteno et al. [20] cues at
higher rates were no more likely to defect than individuals who
displayed them at lower rates. This was the case regardless of
whether we used PD decisions as data points (N = 176, o.r.
= 0.9760.07, P.0.6) or we used individuals as data points and
carried out an ordered logistic regression with a three-level
dependent variable (1 = defect toward both co-participants;
2 = mixed decision; 3 = cooperate toward both co-participants:
n1 = 28, n2 = 6, n3 = 54, coefficient =20.03, P = 0.67). The mean
(6SD) unit-weighed DeSteno et al. [20] cue frequencies of these
three classes of participants were, respectively, 5.0963.25,
3.8361.60, and 4.7162.94.
When we added the DeSteno et al. [20] cues to the predictive
model of PD decisions described in the Introduction [48], it had
no significant independent relationship to PD play, and the
proportion of variance explained by the model fell slightly.
Discussion
In natural social life, judgments of others’ propensities to
cooperate occur under many different circumstances. Experimen-
tal work on defector-detection should seek to simulate a wide
range of these contexts, to illuminate the scope and limits of
whatever defector-detection mechanisms have evolved in humans.
In this paper we add to existing literature by conducting a ‘‘small
talk’’ session among participants, and only later introducing them
to the prisoner’s dilemma game. This resembles everyday first
meetings between strangers who may later cooperate with each
other, but still maintains experimental control by using an
economic game. We coded conversational behavior, and used
the game data, other self-report data and attractiveness ratings of
participants to (1) assess the accuracy and the between-participant
reliability of gameplay guesses and (2) document empirical
predictors of the guesses themselves, and examine how these
varied across types of judges. By comparing four categories of
guessers – recipients of PD decisions, third party insiders, and
naı¨ve and informed outsiders – we accounted for the cognitive
load of conversation participation, and for the importance of
foreknowledge of the upcoming game.
Insiders’ guesses are not accurate
Conversation participants were no better than chance at
predicting gameplay decisions. Our data suggest that this may
be because participants base their predictions of an actor’s play on
their own decision toward that actor, and base third-party
predictions largely on their second-party predictions for that
actor. Although the first of these heuristics was erroneous, the
second was generally valid—actors did tend to make the same
decision toward both co-participants.
In this study, as in DeSteno et al. [20], participants made their
own gameplay decisions before being asked to make predictions.
As a result, participants may have aligned their predictions with
Table 2. Bivariate logistic regressions predicting 2nd party
guesses (recipient guessing actor’s PD decision toward
recipient).
Independent variable N (clusters) odds ratio±SE P
DeSteno et al. [20] cues
by actor
180 (90) 1.0460.05 0.50
Recipient’s attractiveness 208 (104) 0.8860.17 0.49
Actor’s zip code median
income
200 (104) 1.0460.14 0.78
Actor’s F1 LSRPa score 208 (104) 1.1760.16 0.27
Recipient interrupts actor
(per min)
208 (104) 0.6160.21 0.15
Interruption rate6
actor F1 LSRP a
208 (104) 0.6960.17 0.13
Common ground b6
actor F1 LSRP a
208 (104) 1.2660.25 0.25
1 = cooperate, 0 = defect.
aprimary psychopathy.
b1 = yes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0082531.t002
Table 3. Bivariate logistic regressions predicting 3rd party
insider guesses (other guessing actor’s PD decision toward
recipient).
Independent variable N (clusters) odds ratio±SE P
DeSteno et al. [20] cues
by actor
180 (90) 0.9960.06 0.90
Recipient’s attractiveness 210 (105) 1.3960.24 0.06
Actor’s zip code median
income
202 (105) 1.0160.15 0.93
Actor’s F1 LSRPa score 210 (105) 1.0760.17 0.65
Recipient interrupts actor
(per min)
210 (105) 0.6560.23 0.22
Interruption rate6
actor F1 LSRP a
210 (105) 0.7960.22 0.39
Common ground b6
actor F1 LSRP a
210 (105) 1.6360.58 0.17
1 = cooperate, 0 = defect.
aprimary psychopathy.
b1 = yes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0082531.t003
Table 4. Bivariate logistic regressions predicting naı¨ve video
viewer guesses.
Independent variable N (clusters) odds ratio±SE P
DeSteno et al. (20) cues
by actor
356 (70) 1.0860.05 0.11
Recipient’s attractiveness 416 (70) 1.0360.09 0.75
Actor’s zip code median
income
400 (70) 1.1560.12 0.19
Actor’s F1 LSRPa score 416 (70) 0.8760.08 0.14
Recipient interrupts actor
(per min)
416 (70) 0.9260.16 0.63
Interruption rate6
actor F1 LSRPa
416 (70) 0.7760.14 0.15
Common groundb6
actor F1 LSRPa
416 (70) 0.7460.14 0.12
1 = cooperate, 0 = defect.
aprimary psychopathy.
b1 = yes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0082531.t004
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their own PD decisions. In Reed et al. [19], participants predicted
co-participants’ PD decisions before making their own decisions;
in Frank et al. [17] and Brosig [18], the order is not made explicit.
Either cognitive dissonance reduction or false consensus beliefs
may explain why actors failed to accurately anticipate defection.
False consensus beliefs in social dilemma decisions refer to the
tendencies of selfish individuals to believe that most people are
selfish, while (to a lesser extent) prosocial individuals believe that
most people are prosocial [36,53].
We report elsewhere that socioeconomic status and subclinical
psychopathy are predictive of players’ choices to cooperate or
defect [48]. Both socioeconomic status [54] and psychopathy [55]
can be judged accurately from thin slices of behavior. Thus, our
participants had the potential to use an implicit version of the
Gervais et al. [48] model to discern others’ likelihood of
cooperation or defection, although we have no evidence that they
did accurately judge SES or psychopathy.
We argue that participants are failing to predict defection
because they are depending on a flawed folk model of defection,
and not because they unable to detect relevant cues. Holding
guessers’ own PD decisions constant, we found that recipients were
more likely to predict cooperation by co-participants who were
higher in primary psychopathy. This supports the view [56] that
psychopathy includes a convincingly ‘‘charming’’ self-presentation,
and that subclinical primary psychopathy may support adaptive
unilateral defection (see [48]). In general, third party insiders seem
to expect that others will favor more attractive participants—they
are more likely to predict cooperation by an actor towards more
attractive participants (when controlling for how they expect that
actor to play towards themselves). Since actors are more likely to
cooperate toward more attractive co-participants, this can actually
boost predictive accuracy.
Naı¨ve outsiders’ guesses are only moderately accurate
Naı¨ve video viewers, unlike conversation participants, ap-
proached better-than-chance prediction accuracy, and their
cross-sex predictions were significantly more accurate than
chance. The latter (unpredicted) result might reflect the operation
of domain-specific mechanisms for detecting untrustworthiness in
the opposite sex and thereby avoiding sexual exploitation
(abandonment, cuckoldry, etc.). We are skeptical of this interpre-
tation, because all conversation groups were single-sex—whereas
Table 5. Bivariate logistic regressions predicting informed
video viewer guesses.
Independent variable N (clusters) odds ratio±SE P
DeSteno et al. (20) cues
by actor
359 (35) 1.0060.04 0.95
Recipient’s attractiveness 419 (35) 1.0960.11 0.41
Actor’s zip code median
income
403 (35) 1.1960.12 0.10
Actor’s F1 LSRPa score 419 (35) 0.9060.10 0.37
Recipient interrupts actor
(per min)
419 (35) 1.1760.30 0.54
Interruption rate6
actor F1 LSRPa
419 (35) 0.6260.08 ,0.001
Common groundb6
actor F1 LSRPa
419 (35) 0.9260.19 0.68
1 = cooperate, 0 = defect.
aprimary psychopathy.
b1 = yes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0082531.t005
Table 6. Multivariate logistic regression models predicting 2nd party guesses (recipient guessing actor’s PD decision toward
recipient).
Model Model 1a Model 2b Model 3c Model 4d
N (clusters) 196 (102) 200 (104) 171 (101) 174 (103)
Independent variable
Recipient’s PD decision toward actor 112.42669.29*** – 115.40675.59*** –
DeSteno et al. [20] cues by actor – – 1.0060.08 1.0460.06
Recipient’s attractiveness 1.0260.29 0.8560.16 1.0060.32 0.8160.17
Actor’s zip code median income 0.9860.21 0.9860.14 1.0060.25 1.0060.17
Actor’s F1 LSRPe score 1.7160.47* 1.3460.29 1.5960.45 1.3260.31
Recipient interrupts actor (per min) 1.5460.76 0.5860.22 1.3460.74 0.6760.28
Actor/recipient CGf 2.2361.021 1.8360.601 2.0461.05 1.6760.60
Interruption rate6 actor F1 LSRPe 0.6760.20 0.7160.18 0.7960.23 0.7360.21
CGf6 actor F1 LSRPe 0.4860.21 1.0460.35 0.5060.23 1.0960.39
Wald x2 65.49 8.64 61.89 6.06
r2 0.49 0.04 0.48 0.03
P ,0.0001 0.28 ,0.0001 0.64
1 = cooperate, 0 = defect. 1P,0.10. *P,0.05. ***P,0.001.
aGervais et al. [45] predictor variables including recipient’s PD decision toward actor.
bGervais et al. [45] predictor variables excluding recipient’s PD decision toward actor.
cIncluding DeSteno et al. [20] cues and recipient’s PD decision.
dIncluding DeSteno et al. [20] cues, excluding recipient’s PD decision.
eprimary psychopathy.
fCommon ground. 1 = yes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0082531.t006
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such a domain-specific mechanism would likely require observa-
tion of between-sex interactions. Conversation participants rarely
discussed romantic relationships, and almost all such discussion
was brief and superficial. Moreover, ancestral humans presumably
lived in groups in which intra-sexual cooperation and trustwor-
thiness were comparable, in fitness-relevance, to intersexual
cooperation and trustworthiness [57,58]. An alternate — and,
we think, more likely —interpretation is that naı¨ve video viewers
Table 7. Multivariate logistic regression models predicting 3rd party insider guesses (other guessing actor’s PD decision toward
recipient).
Model Model 1a Model 2b Model 3c Model 4d
N (clusters) 200 (104) 202 (105) 174 (103) 174 (103)
Independent variable
Other’s guess of actor’s PD decision
toward other
90.08656.21*** – 188.516151.12*** –
DeSteno et al. [20] cues by actor – – 0.9360.08 0.9860.06
Recipient’s attractiveness 1.6060.34* 1.3060.24 1.7660.45* 1.2760.25
Actor’s zip code median income 0.9660.18 1.0060.15 1.0360.22 1.0460.17
Actor’s F1 LSRPe score 0.8860.32 1.0860.25 0.7360.27 1.0360.25
Recipient interrupts actor (per min) 0.5160.26 0.6260.22 0.7660.50 0.8360.33
Actor/recipient CGf 1.3260.64 1.8560.75 1.1860.70 1.7060.74
Interruption rate6 actor F1 LSRPe 1.2160.58 0.7260.25 1.3360.63 0.7660.27
CGf6 actor F1 LSRPe 1.8161.08 1.8260.651 1.9561.43 1.8160.641
Wald x2 63.54 10.53 71.57 8.09
r2 0.50 0.05 0.55 0.04
P ,0.0001 0.16 ,0.0001 0.42
1 = cooperate, 0 = defect. 1P,0.10. *P,0.05. ***P,0.001.
aGervais et al. (45) predictor variables including other’s guess of actor’s PD decision toward other.
bGervais et al. (45) predictor variables excluding other’s guess of actor’s PD decision toward other.
cIncluding DeSteno et al. [20] cues and other’s guess of actor’s PD decision toward other.
dIncluding DeSteno et al. [20] cues, excluding other’s guess of actor’s PD decision toward other.
eprimary psychopathy.
fCommon ground. 1 = yes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0082531.t007
Table 8. Multivariate logistic regression models predicting video viewers’ guesses of actor’s PD decision toward recipient.
Naı¨ve video viewers Informed video viewers
Model Model 1
a Model 2b Model 1a Model 2b
N (clusters) 400 (70) 344 (70) 403 (35) 347 (35)
Independent variable
DeSteno et al. [20] cues by actor – 1.0760.05 – 0.9860.04
Recipient’s attractiveness 1.1060.10 1.1560.12 1.1360.13 1.1560.12
Actor’s zip code median income 1.1760.13 1.0860.13 1.2260.131 1.2060.14
Actor’s F1 LSRPc score 1.1460.21 1.1160.23 1.1260.18 1.1160.20
Recipient interrupts actor (per min) 1.1760.23 1.2260.29 1.5860.421 1.6560.441
Actor/recipient common groundd 0.7760.13 0.6960.141 1.3860.38 1.2360.35
Interruption rate6 actor F1 LSRPc 0.7760.12 0.9260.18 0.5960.08*** 0.6360.10**
Common groundd6 actor F1 LSRPc 0.7760.15 0.6160.13* 1.0060.21 1.0060.23
Wald x2 13.36 16.90 21.25 17.00
r2 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02
P 0.06 0.03 0.003 0.03
1 = cooperate, 0 = defect. 1P,0.10. *P,0.05. **P,0.01. ***P,0.001.
aGervais et al. [45] predictor variables.
bGervais et al. [45] predictor variables plus DeSteno et al. [20] cues by actor.
cprimary psychopathy.
d1 = yes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0082531.t008
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paid closer attention, on average, to video of opposite-sexed
conversation groups, resulting in better perception of cues of trust
and trustworthiness.
Naı¨ve video viewers may be more accurate than conversation
participants for several reasons. First, since video viewers made no
PD decisions, they were free from the effects of cognitive
dissonance reduction and false consensus beliefs. Video viewers
were also free of the cognitive load entailed by the demands of self-
presentation during a face-to-face interaction [47]. Finally, they
were free of any neurophysiological or hormonal effects of face-to-
face interactions [45,46]. We did not directly measure any such
effects. However, our finding that video viewers, unlike conver-
sation participants, significantly underestimated overall rates of
cooperation, is consistent with the view that distinctive character-
istics of participating in (and not merely witnessing) face-to-face
interaction elevate general expectations of prosociality, though
they fail to improve, and may even worsen, predictive accuracy.
Interestingly, Vogt et al. ([43]; C. Efferson, personal communica-
tion) found no significant differences between overall rates of
guesses of cooperation and overall rates of actual cooperation
when the stimuli were videotaped monologues rather than
videotaped conversations.
Video viewers experienced the disadvantage of viewing only one
person en face. Since facial expressions (particularly Duchenne
smiles) are important for cooperator-detection [19,24,25,27,59],
video-viewers should be most accurate in their predictions about
the single en face player. This prediction received no support from
our data, but perhaps video viewers’ predictions were based on
dyad-level rather than individual-level cues. This interpretation is
consistent with our findings that video viewers were more likely
than conversation participants to predict individually divergent PD
decisions.
The cues used by naı¨ve video viewers in making their
marginally accurate guesses remain a puzzle. They were not
using a folk or implicit equivalent of the Gervais et al. [48] model
of PD decision making, since the strongest effect from this model
(the common ground-actor primary psychopathy interaction) was
significant in the opposite direction of this variable’s effect on
actual PD decisions, and the main effect of recipient’s interruptions
of actor also trended in the opposite direction to that observed on
PD decisions. Nor were they using the De Steno et al. [20] cues.
Informed outsiders’ guesses are not accurate
Informed video viewers, who were presumably consciously
seeking cues to post-conversation defection, failed to guess PD
decisions at better-than-chance levels, and did not show the cross-
sex effect found in naı¨ve video viewers. These results are consistent
with Bonnefon et al.’s [60] finding that people’s accuracy at
predicting behavior in a trust game declined with the availability of
additional information. In predicting social dilemma decisions,
more information may hurt rather than help. On the other hand,
Vogt et al. [43] found that adding audio content to video of brief
monologues increased (though nonsignificantly) viewers’ accuracy
at predicting anonymous PD decisions.
Our results may be explained by the confluence of three
attributes of the informed video viewer condition, which together
impeded accurate social judgment: (1) the behavioral slices (10-
min triadic conversations) were ‘‘thick’’ enough to provide input
into a wide variety of social judgment heuristics, the relative weight
of which varied among video viewers; (2) conversation participants
were ignorant of the post-conversation PD and were therefore not
deliberately displaying or eliciting signs of prosociality or
trustworthiness; and (3) uniquely to the informed video viewer
condition, video viewers were seeking such signs, and they varied
in the extent to which they processed the difference between their
own perspective (knowing about the post-conversation PD) and the
uninformed perspective of the conversation participants. In other
words, the perspective-taking task required of the informed video
viewers may have been too demanding for participants to yield
accurate judgments. Informed video viewers needed to (1)
distinguish between their own knowledge and the conversation
participants’ ignorance of the PD and (2) if they viewed the PD as
an assurance game [32–34], judge the conversation participants’
judgments of one another’s trustworthiness.
Future research could determine whether individual variation in
measures of social intelligence such as interpersonal sensitivity [61]
is associated with accurate judgment in this or a similar task. The
informed video viewer task was also, arguably, less ecologically
valid than the naı¨ve video viewers’ task. Quick and automatic
person perception along general dimensions (e.g., warmth and
competence [62]) is a widely demonstrated process with obvious
adaptive benefits. The more complex task that we asked of the
informed video viewers may lie outside the range of problems that
human social judgment mechanisms were designed to solve [63].
For reasons discussed above, viewing a social interaction among
strangers while attending to signs of cooperative intent may be too
contrived a situation to elicit accurate social judgments.
Putative cues of defection were neither used by guessers
nor predictive of game play
None of three independent sets of observers (conversation
participants, naı¨ve video viewers, or informed video viewers) used
the unit-weighted average of actors’ frequencies of arms crossed, lean
back, hand touch, and face touch as a cue of probability of defecting.
Nor was actual defection associated with a higher frequency of
engaging in this set of behaviors. We tentatively suggest four
reasons for this failure to replicate the result of DeSteno et al. [20].
First, their experimental protocol involved dyads, whereas ours
involved conversational triads followed by dyadic games. As
implied by DeSteno et al’s [20] emphasis on the context-
dependent nature of cues to untrustworthiness, the four afore-
mentioned behaviors may cue dyadic disengagement rather than a
stable individual propensity to defect. In a triadic interaction,
many nonverbal behaviors (particularly self-directed behaviors) are
not directed specifically toward either co-participant, and this may
reduce their power to predict particular dyadic choices. In
conjunction with our participants’ strong tendencies to make
consistent decisions toward both co-participants (a pattern
probably generated by causes outside the conversation itself), this
ambiguity could eliminate the cue validity of the DeSteno et al.
[20] behaviors. Second, DeSteno et al. [20] used a social dilemma
with five choices, whereas we used a standard PD, which provides
only 2 choices. Thus, our study’s measure of trustworthiness may
have been insufficiently sensitive to detect the effect that they
found. However, Tables 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 show that we failed
to observe even a consistent trend toward an association of these
cues with defection. Third, although DeSteno et al. [20] write that
‘‘[t]here was no expectation that partners would see each other
again (1551),’’ all their participants were drawn from the same
undergraduate participant pool, and, unlike in our study, the
experimenters made no effort to conceal partners’ game-play
choices from each other. Therefore, their study design obscures
the distinction between trustworthiness and concern about
reputation. Fourth, the four cues that predicted defection in
DeSteno et al.’s [20] study were determined empirically from a set
of 12 cues, and there is no compelling theoretical explanation for
why these four, and no others, significantly predicted low offers.
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Thus, their result might not be generalizable to other samples or
experimental designs.
Conclusions
Our results have implications for the study of the evolution of
human cooperation. Naı¨ve outsiders, but not interaction partic-
ipants, were able to accurately judge inclinations to cooperate or
defect, although it is likely that the observed levels of accuracy
would be insufficient to support the evolution of one-shot
cooperation under realistic assumptions about the benefit-to-cost
ratio of cooperation [43]. This suggests that honest signaling of
intentions and accurate defector detection have played a limited
role in how human prosociality evolved. This inference is
consistent with a considerable body of theoretical literature, which
indicates that on an evolutionary timescale such ‘‘greenbeard’’
signals of cooperative intent are easily eroded by cheaters, or
deceptive defectors who signal intent to cooperate [13,14,64–66].
Alternative theoretical explanations for human cooperation in
one-shot social dilemmas, such as cultural group selection [2,7] or
the ancestral ubiquity of repeated interactions [8,67] may be more
promising. In addition, our findings suggest that eavesdropping
could be an important means of information gathering about
potential social partners. Outstanding questions include (1) under
what contexts social cognition is more efficient in eavesdroppers
than in interlocutors, and (2) whether there are adaptive
explanations for these differences.
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